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Abstract:  
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between environmental regulation and 
economic growth. A four-equation regional growth model is used to analyze the simultaneous 
relationships among changes in population, employment, per capita income, and 
environmental regulations for the 410 counties in Appalachia. Our results reveal that initial 
conditions for environmental regulation are negatively related to regional growth factors of 
change in population, per capita income, and total employment. From this, we infer that the 
diversion of resources from production and investment activities to pollution abatement is 
inadvertently transmitted to other sectors of the economy—thereby resulting in a slow-down of 
regional growth. We also find robust evidence that show that changes in environmental 
regulations positively influence changes in population, total employment, and per capita income. 
Thus, we parsimoniously conclude that in the long-run, environmental regulations are not 
detrimental to economic growth.  
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1. Introduction  
Following the passage of the Clean Air Act [CAA] in 1970
3
, there have been heated 
debates on the economic impacts of U.S. air quality regulations (Denison, 1979; Portney, 1981; 
Bartik, 1985; Barbera and McConnell, 1986; Christainsen and Haveman, 1981). Despite 
extensive study and debate, the relationship between environmental regulations and economic 
growth is still not well understood. While several researchers including, List and Co (1999), 
Gray and Shadbegian (1993), and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a) find evidence that 
environmental regulations negatively affect economic growth, Porter (1991) and Porter and van 
der Linde (1995) argue that environmental regulations stimulate technological innovation and 
this, subsequently leads to industrial growth. This view is known as the Porter hypothesis.
4
  
Moreover, the focus of earlier studies has been exclusively on affected industries in the 
manufacturing sector (Duffy-Deno, 1992; Jaffe and Palmer, 1996; List and Co, 1999). The 
justification for this is that many of the environmental policies are directed at manufacturing 
industries, and therefore, aggregate changes in employment, firm expansion or contraction will 
directly affect polluting firms (Bartik, 1985). However, manufacturing is not isolated from the 
rest of the national economy and as such, the effects of environmental regulations on 
manufacturing industries may have spin-off effects on other sectors of the economy which 
supply goods and services to the manufacturing sector, and consequently affect the pattern of 
regional growth. To reinforce this view, Yandle (1985, p. 39) points out that the ―effects of 
                                                          
3
 The 1970 Clean Air Act set National Ambient Air Quality Standards [NAAQS] for six major air pollutants: 
tropospheric ozone (O3), total suspended particulates (TSP), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2), and lead (Pb). The CAA was first amended in 1977 and later in 1990. 
4
 The Porter hypothesis could work because firms complying with state and local environmental regulations will 
invest in new capital equipment that improve productivity and at the same time help reduce emissions of pollutants. 
An improvement in air quality has an amenity value and that may also affect the pattern of economic growth (Van, 
2002; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). 
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environmental regulations go far beyond the physical plant closings and worker layoffs" and that 
the regional concentration of polluting industries may affect regional development.  
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the impact of environmental regulation on 
economic growth remains an open question. Cole et al. (2006) assert that this is because 
environmental regulations have been treated as exogenous. In the same breath, Fredriksson and 
Millimet (2002b) and Condliffe and Morgan (2009) note that the variables used as proxies for 
environmental regulations introduce endogeneity bias in the estimation. This is because 
environmental regulations can be endogenously determined by a number of factors such as 
income, population, and employment change, including other socio-economic factors. This 
suggests that an accurate representation in an econometric model must account for simultaneity 
between environmental regulation and economic growth.  
To this end, one unexplored area in the empirical literature is the use of structural 
equations in estimating the environmental regulations-economic growth relationship. The 
analyses presented in this study assume that environmental regulations are endogenous and are 
jointly determined with per capita income, population, and total employment. Specifically, the 
purpose of this research is to address a number of questions that have arisen concerning the 
relationship between environmental regulation and economic growth. The questions are: to what 
extent does environmental regulation influence regional growth patterns, and conversely, to what 
extent do regional factors influence environmental regulations?  
To address these questions, unlike in previous research, we assume that simultaneous 
interactions exist among county changes in environmental regulations, per capita income, 
population, and total employment. Thus, total employment, per capita income, population, and 
environmental regulations are treated as endogenous variables and are specified in a four-
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equation regional growth simultaneous model. We employ county attainment status of the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards [NAAQS]
i
 as a proxy for environmental regulations, 
and allow the cross-sectional variation of the attainment variable.  
The motivation for specifying a four-equation simultaneous model is straightforward: 1) 
assuming that environmental quality is a normal good, ceteris paribus, individuals with higher 
incomes will support more stringent environmental regulations—thus, we hypothesize that 
higher incomes positively influence environmental regulations; 2) changes in population and 
industry concentration, including other firms‘ rent seeking activities will result in changes in 
environmental quality. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that changes in population and total 
employment will positively influence the stringency of environmental regulations; and 3) 
enforcement of environmental regulations will result in improved environmental quality and 
make a location more attractive for households and businesses. This means that environmental 
regulations may positively influence population growth, income growth, and employment growth 
and vice versa.   
This study contributes to the current discussion on economic impacts of  environmental 
regulation by using a regional growth model that takes into account the interdependences among 
changes in environmental regulations, population, total employment, and per capita income at 
the county-level in the Appalachian Region. In order to account for state differences in growth 
patterns and environmental regulation implementation, we include state dummy variables in our 
empirical model. The second contribution of this study is that the empirical analyses are 
extended beyond firms and industries affected by environmental regulations.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the analytical 
framework for modeling the relationship between environmental regulations and growth, while 
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section 3 presents data sources and types. Finally, sections 4 and 5 present the results and 
conclusions, respectively.  
2. Analytical Framework 
Within the context of the environmental Kuznets curve literature, factors such as 
population density, income, industrial composition, and other socio-economic indicators have 
been found to be influence the level of environmental pollution. This argument implies that 
factors that influence the level of pollution also have a bearing on environmental regulation 
stringency. From the concepts of utility and profit maximization, it is conceivable that consumers 
and firms will respond to spatial variations in environmental quality
5
 (due to differences in 
environmental regulation stringency) and this may consequently affect the equilibrium levels of 
population, employment, and income growth rates across regions. These stylized facts are shown 
in figure 1. 
According to figure 1, when environmental regulations are imposed, firms in the short-
run will incur higher production costs due to investments in abatement technologies. 
Accordingly, the diversion of resources from production and investment activities will lead to 
slower economic growth in terms of per capita income and employment growth. Another fact 
underlying figure 1 is that in the long-run, environmental regulations enable firms to improve a 
jurisdiction‘s air quality and allow firms to reduce the marginal cost of pollution control and 
production, respectively. Therefore, we parsimoniously infer that the long-run gain of 
environmental regulations is reduced production cost for regulated firms and improved 
environmental quality. In the aggregate, environmental regulations have multiplier effects in 
                                                          
5
 Hosoe and Naito (2006) find evidence that variations in environmental regulation implementation among and 
within states have significant impacts on the mobility of capital and other resources across local jurisdictions. 
Similarly, the amenities literature show that an improvement in environmental has amenity value, which in turn 
helps to attract workers, businesses and wealthy retirees (Van, 2002; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Goetz, 1996).    
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terms of attracting new firms, skilled workers, and wealthy retirees—and this also translates into 
increased per capita income for a given jurisdiction.  
 
Figure 1: Long-Run Relationship between Environmental Regulations and Regional Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modified version of Goetz et al. (p. 99, 1996) 
To understand the above economic impacts of environmental regulations from a regional 
perspective, we extend Deller et al.‘s (2001) model by specifying a four-equation simultaneous 
regional growth model. We assume that there is a lag-adjustment process between a change in 
one of the endogenous variables and the other endogenous variables. In a general equilibrium 
framework, population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are not only 
interdependent, but will also interact with exogenous factors, including the lagged values of the 
other endogenous variables.  
The general form of the four-equation simultaneous model representing the interactions 
among population (P), employment (E), income (Y), and environmental regulations (ER) are 
specified as: 
Stricter Environmental 
Regulations 
 
Better Environmental 
Quality 
Net Attraction of Firms 
Attraction of Skilled 
Workers 
Increased Productivity 
Attraction of Wealthy 
Retirees 
Higher cost/lower 
output 
Per capita income  
[+] 
 
Lower Production 
Cost/Higher output 
[+] 
[-] 
[+] 
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(1)  
(2)  
(3)  
(4)  
Where represent equilibrium levels of population, employment, per capita 
income, and environmental regulations, respectively in the  county;  
represent a set of exogenous variables that have either a direct or indirect effect on population, 
employment, income, and environmental regulations. Equations (1) through (4) state that 
equilibrium levels of population, employment, income, and environmental regulations depend on 
actual population, employment, income, and environmental regulations, including other 
exogenous variables in s. 
It is assumed that endogenous variables are not fully adjusted and that the endogenous 
variables adjust to equilibrium levels with substantial lags (Mills and Price, 1984). Following 
this relationship, the distributed partial adjustment models for the equilibrium levels for 
population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are specified as: 
(5)  
(6)  
(7)  
(8)  
The subscript refers to the initial conditions of the endogenous variables, which in this 
case are the 1992 values;  represent the speed-of-adjustment coefficients to 
desired levels of population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation. 
Adjustment coefficients are assumed to be positive and between zero and one. Equations (5) 
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through (8) show that current employment, population, income, and environmental regulations 
are dependent on their initial conditions and on the change between equilibrium values and on its 
lagged values. 
After rearranging equations (5) to (8), the change in population, employment, income, 
and environmental regulation equations are written as:  
(9)  
(10)  
(11)  
(12) , 
 represents change in population, employment  income, and environmental regulations, 
respectively. The changes in the endogenous variables are derived from the difference between 
the 2007 observations and 1992 observations. Substituting equations (9) through (12) into the 
right-hand side of equations (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively, we eliminate the right hand 
unobservable equilibrium values and obtain the econometric model to be estimated. The 
proposed empirical model consists of a system of four simultaneous equations describing 
population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation changes, respectively.  
(13) 
 
(14) 
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(15) 
 
(16) 
 
The dependent variables ∆POP, ∆EMP, ∆Y, and ∆ER denote county changes in population, 
employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation, respectively; where 
 represent the structural error terms,  is a vector of exogenous variables, 
and DUM is a vector of 13 state dummy variables.
 6
 As already discussed, the lag adjustment 
models assume that the endogenous variables do not adjust instantaneously to their equilibrium 
levels but rather over a period of time. Deller et al. (2001) point out that the speed of adjustment 
to equilibrium levels is embedded in the coefficients α, β, and δ. Therefore, equations (13) to 
(16) estimate the short-term adjustments of population, employment, income, and environmental 
regulations to their long-term equilibrium levels of (P
*
, E
*
, Y
*
, and ER
*
). 
3. Data  
The study area is confined to the 410 counties of the Appalachian Region, which includes 
all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The data 
covers the years 1992 to 2007 (Appendix 1). The dependent variables used in the models are 
measured as absolute changes in population, employment, income, and environmental 
regulations (1992-2007). County-level data for population, employment, and income are 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System 
                                                          
6
 13 state dummy variables are included as explanatory variables to capture the effect of state differences in 
environmental regulation implementation and to capture the state influence on economic growth.   
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(REIS) and County and City Data Book (C&CDB) covering the years 1992 to 2007. County 
attainment status is used as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency and the data is 
obtained from the Federal Code of Regulations, Title 40, part 81, subpart C, covering the years 
1992 to 2007. 
Attainment status of a county is an appealing proxy for environmental regulation 
stringency because air quality problems result from stationary pollution sources such as power 
plants, factories, farming, heating of buildings, as well as cars, buses, and other mobile sources. 
Together, these sources represent production and consumption activities that contribute to 
environmental degradation. It can also be argued that county attainment status is an appropriate 
measure for environmental regulation stringency because its enforcement is felt by the county‘s 
households and firms; therefore, the analysis of such impacts must be made at county-level 
(Greenstone, 2002). 
Given that a county can be out-of-attainment with respect to several air pollutants, the 
environmental regulation variable is an index of the total number of pollutants for which a 
county is out-of-attainment. The environmental regulation index is constructed using 
Henderson‘s (1997) methodology of summing the number of criteria pollutants a county is out-
of-attainment. The criteria pollutants considered are ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon 
monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), and total suspended particulates (TSP). Following Henderson (1997) 
and List (2001), the attainment variable takes on values from 0 (cleanest county and least 
regulated) to 5 (dirtiest and most regulated)—and generally depends on the number of pollutants 
the county is out-of-attainment. For example, a county in attainment for five criteria pollutants 
takes on a value of 0, whereas a county out-of-attainment in all five criteria pollutants will be 
coded 5. With regard to the ozone standard, when part of the county has not met the complete 
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federal ozone standard, the EPA assigns to these counties partial attainment or non-attainment 
status. For this reason, counties which are in partial attainment are coded ½.  
A number of explanatory variables are included to explain changes in population, 
employment, income, and environmental regulations. Table 1 presents the exogenous and 
endogenous variables used in the models, along with the summary statistics. County level data 
on per capita income taxes, property taxes, unemployment rates, education levels, median 
housing values, percent of population below poverty line, and per capita local government 
expenditures are included to capture county characteristics that may affect growth. Other control 
variables that may explain growth are number of county manufacturing establishments (MFG), 
metro counties, percentage of population who are active in and retired from the labor force, and 
road infrastructure. Amenity variables (AMEND) are also included in order to capture their 
impact on population, employment, and income growth, respectively.  
Determinants of changes in environmental regulations are captured by community 
activism (Sierra Clubs), growth factors, Democratic Party control,
7
 percentage of population 
driving to work, percentage of black population, and unemployment rate. Other control variables 
that may explain changes in environmental regulations are population density, percentage of 
population with a bachelor‘s degree, percentage of population employed in manufacturing, 
percentage of population who are susceptible to suffer from environmental exposures, and the 
congestion that comes from metro counties.    
4.  
                                                          
7
 Previous studies show that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is influenced by the political party that 
controls the executive branch and legislature (Lynch, et al. 2004; Regens et al., 1997). In particular, the Democratic 
Party is considered to be more supportive of stringent environmental regulations than the Republican Party. In the 
same vein, the Democratic Party is considered to pursue policies that are more pro-employment (Levitt and Porteba, 
1994). As such, we also use the Democratic Party variable to explain changes in employment and per capita income.  
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5. Empirical Results and Analyses 
The focus of this study is on the relationship between environmental regulations and 
economic growth. Table 1 presents estimated coefficients of the equations based on three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimation. The regression results reported exclude state dummy variables.
8
 
Based on the adjusted R
2
 statistics, the estimated models explain 48 percent, 55 percent, 43 
percent, and 62 percent of variations in changes in population, employment, per capita income, 
and environmental regulations, respectively.   
4.1 Change in Population Equation 
Except for environmental regulations, all the initial conditions have a strong effect on 
population growth and have the expected signs. Consistent with theory, results indicate that 
initial conditions of population, employment and income play an important role in determining 
population growth in the Appalachia. Notably, the coefficient estimate for the initial condition of 
population (POP92) has a negative sign and is significant at 1 percent level. This finding 
confirms the convergence hypothesis—which suggests that Appalachian counties which had 
initial high levels of population tend to experience a lower absolute growth rate than counties 
which had low levels of population in the initial period.  
Another important variable that deserves attention is the change in environmental 
regulations. Table 1. shows that the coefficient estimate for change in environmental regulations 
(ENREGCH) has a positive impact on change in population and is statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. One possible explanation may be that stringent environmental regulations result  
                                                          
8
 Complete results with state dummy variables are shown in appendix 2. Overall, results indicate that interstate 
differences in environmental regulation implementation and economic policies differentially and systematically 
influence environmental regulation outcomes and the pattern of regional growth, respectively.  
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Table 1: Three Stage Least Squares Results for Appalachian Region 
Variable  
Name 
Population Employment Per Capita Income 
Environmental 
Regulation 
Coefficient  Value Coefficient  Value Coefficient  Value Coefficient  Value 
Endogenous Variable 
EMPCH 2.081 0.000 - - 0.040 0.006 0.054 0.374 
POPCH - - 0.451 0.000 0.014 0.742 0.004 0.052 
PCICH 1.885 0.002 2.160 0.000 - - 0.062 0.000 
ENREGCH 0.843 0.015 0.520 0.000 0.138 0.000   
Initial Conditions 
EMP92 0.639 0.003 −0.064 0.000 - - - - 
POP92 −0.148 0.000 1.092 0.000 0.060 0.002 0.002 0.016 
PCI92 - -   −0.382 0.000 0.041 0.025 
ENREG92 −0.032 0.104 −0.086 0.000 −0.741 0.000 0.676 0.000 
Economic Variables 
PROPTAX −36.747 0.186 −7.376 0.575     
MFG −6.562 0.714 22.705 0.010 −7.019 0.057 0.007 0.038 
MFGEMP - -     0.003 0.478 
UNEMP −211.173 0.037 −96.683 0.142     
POVRATE - -   −85.830 0.007 0.008 0.000 
PCTAX 3.079 0.191 2.451 0.114 −1.778 0.094 - - 
MHVAL −0.008 0.793 - - - - - - 
LGEXP 1.290 0.004 0.701 0.004 34.126 0.228 - - 
Human Capital and Demographic Variables 
ACTIVE - - - - 37.907 0.172 - - 
DEGREE - - 14.536 0.541 11.818 0.006 0.002 0.000 
POPDEN - - - - - - 0.003 0.001 
RISK - - - - - - 0.008 0.001 
RETIRE - - - - −39.729 0.000 - - 
BLACK - - - - −128.570 0.0807 0.001 0.000 
Locational Variables 
METRO 8401.985 0.000 −2611.31 0.065 - - −0.251 0.000 
ROADDEN 2329.112 0.570 606.332 0.785 - - 0.124 0.002 
CRIME   0.017 0.834 - - - - 
Environmental Quality Variables 
AMEND 1760.273 0.001 −764.216 0.004 863.853 0.151   
VOTE - - 0.650 0.969 99.825 0.043 0.003 0.000 
SIERRA - - - - - - 0.023 0.006 
POPDRIVE - - - - - - 0.004 0.000 
Constant 9013.233 0.001 7389.01 0.020 0.591 0.005 0.528 0.000 
Adj. R
2
 0.483 0.5580 0.4318 0.625 
Sample 
Size 
410 410 410 410 
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in improved environmental quality and thus make local areas more attractive for businesses and 
households. From a neoclassical standpoint, this implies that utility maximizing individuals will 
migrate to areas with better environmental quality. By direct contrast, the initial condition for 
environmental regulations is negative. This result is consistent with the idea that before firms 
adopt air pollution abatement technologies a county‘s air quality is poor and this phenomenon 
will discourage population growth.  
The coefficient for change in employment (EMPCH) is positive and significant in the 
population equation. This suggests that county employment growth (or an increase in labor 
demand) stimulates population growth. This finding is consistent with the jobs-follow-people 
hypothesis (Steinnes and Fisher, 1974).  Also, the role of per capita income change (PCICH) in 
explaining growth in population is strong, as reflected by the magnitude and positive sign of the 
coefficient (significant at the 5 percent level).  
Generally, high unemployment rates indicate economic distress and a dearth of 
employment opportunities, and this relationship is reflected by the negative coefficient on 
unemployment rate. The coefficient for metropolitan county (METRO) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding reinforces the notion that metropolitan 
counties have an array of economic activities which promote agglomeration economies, and this 
may have a pull-effect on population.
9
 The regression analysis also reveals a significant positive 
relationship between the amenities index (AMEND) and population growth. These findings are 
consistent with results from previous studies (McGranahan, 1999; Deller et al., 2001).  
 
                                                          
9
 Data from the 2000 United States census indicate that about 57 percent of Appalachian residents lived in 
metropolitan counties, compared to 80 percent of the U.S. residents.  
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4.2 Change in Employment Equation 
The estimated results for the change in employment equation are shown in column 3 of 
table 2. The initial condition for employment (EMP92) has a statistically significant and negative 
effect on employment growth. The implication of this finding is that counties with initial low 
employment levels in the 1990s are experiencing faster growth in employment than counties 
which had high initial levels of employment. These results are consistent with findings from 
previous studies (Gebremariam et al., 2007; Black et al., 2007) about the convergence in 
employment rates in the Appalachian region. Black et al. (2007) attribute the convergence of 
employment in Appalachia to the wide diversification of the Appalachian economy. 
Accordingly, this diversification has resulted in the growth of the service sector, retail sector, and 
growth in government employment.  
The estimated coefficient on initial conditions for population (POP92) is statistically 
significant and positive, thus supporting the hypothesis that people follow jobs. An increase in 
population entails a larger supply of labor. The positive effect of population on employment 
growth is supported by evidence from the Appalachian Regional Commission which shows that 
between 2002 and 2004, there was a large growth of employment in Appalachia as well as in the 
nation as a whole.
10
 Therefore, it is surmised that the increase in population did not diminish 
employment opportunities, but rather was necessary to meet the increasing demand for labor. 
As expected, initial environmental regulations (ENREG92) have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on employment growth. The plausible explanation for this negative 
correlation is that, following the designation of counties as attainment or non-attainment in 1990, 
the EPA required states to submit state implementation plans (SIPs) at the end of 1992. 
                                                          
10
 See Appalachian Region Employment Report on  
http://www.arc.gov/images/appregion/AppalachianRegionEmploymentReport2009Q2.pdf   
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Therefore, between 1990 and 1992 polluting firms faced stringent standards with regard to 
pollution control and thus shows that stringent environmental regulations negatively affect 
employment growth in the initial years of implementation due to the fact that polluting firms 
have to install expensive pollution abatement control equipment. The effect of this may 
inadvertently be transmitted to other sectors of the economy, thereby resulting in the overall 
slow-down of total employment growth.  
On the other hand, the coefficient on the change in environmental regulations 
(ENREGCH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results 
underscore the Porter hypothesis by indicating that firms‘ marginal costs of abatement and 
production may decrease over time as firms invest in efficient technology. The efficient 
technology firms invest in serves the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing 
environmental quality, such that areas with better environmental quality become important 
locations for business investment.
11
 These finding are consistent with previous studies (Goetz et 
al. 1996; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ringquist, 1993) in revealing that the short-run effects 
of environmental regulation are reduced employment growth, but in the long-run environmental 
regulation positively influences employment growth. 
Also, the coefficient on the change in population (POPCH) is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level and is positively related to employment growth. This finding, again, confirms 
the ―people-follow-jobs‖ hypothesis of Steinnes and Fisher (1974). Similarly, a change in per 
capita income (PCICH) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is positively related 
to employment growth. This means that Appalachian counties with high income experienced 
                                                          
11
 If we assume that an improvement in environmental quality has an amenity value, it is expected that firms and 
individuals will migrate to these regions, thereby stimulate growth in employment. 
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increased growth in employment. This could be attributed to the economy-wide diversification 
that has taken place in the Appalachia.  
4.3 Change in Per Capita Income Equation 
Three stage least squares regression results for the change in per capita income equation 
are reported in column 4 of table 2. The sign and level of significance for the initial condition for 
environmental regulation (ENREG92) mirrors results obtained in the employment and population 
equations (negative and significant at the 1 percent level). The initial conditions for 
environmental regulations intuitively mean that an area‘s environmental quality is poor, and this 
has the effect of discouraging capital and labor migration. Therefore, in order to bring the air 
quality into compliance with federal standards, firms in non-attainment counties invest in 
pollution abatement technologies. Investments in the initial period result in increased production 
costs and reduced output, hence reducing labor demand. Because of the spinoff effects, other 
sectors of the economy will also be negatively affected and consequently reduce growth in per 
capita.  
Except for the change in population (POPCH) variable, all endogenous variables are 
significant in explaining growth in per capita income. Economic theory shows that growth in 
employment (EMPCH) results in an increase in aggregate labor demand, and as a result, higher 
per capita income. The variable EMPCH has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5 
percent level. These findings provide empirical evidence of the hypothesized positive impact of 
employment growth on per capita income growth.  
The estimated coefficient for change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding is consistent with the 
amenities literature which shows that an improvement in air quality positively influences per 
17 
 
capita income growth (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Goetz et al., 1996). To this end, we 
parsimoniously interpret the initial conditions of environmental regulations as the short-run 
effects of environmental regulations due to the fact that in the initial period, firms in non-
attainment regions invest in pollution abatement technologies. By contrast, we interpret the 
change in environmental regulations as long-run effects.   
Consistent with theory, an increase in local tax per capita (PCTAX) has a negative effect 
on per capita income growth, because taxes are an additional cost to individuals. Thus high tax 
counties will become unattractive locations for households. Regression results show that the 
percent of population below the poverty level (POVRATE) is inversely related to per capita 
income growth. The coefficient for poverty rate (POVRATE) is significant at the 5 percent level. 
The estimated coefficient for manufacturing establishment (MFG) shows a negative relationship 
with per capita income growth and is only significant at the 10 percent level. Perhaps the logical 
explanation for this negative correlation may be that manufacturing‘s role in the Appalachian 
region has evidently declined over the years, to the extent of reducing its contribution to per 
capita income growth and gross state product in general.  
Again, the Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE) variable is included to capture 
political party influence on economic growth. The hypothesis that Democratic Party control is 
associated with increased economic growth is confirmed, based on the positive and significant 
coefficient for VOTE. Similarly, location attributes, such as amenities (AMEND) are positively 
related to income growth, but its coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient for the percentage of 
population with a bachelor‘s degree or above (DEGREE) is positive and significant, providing 
support for the positive relationship between human capital skills and income growth.  
18 
 
The percentage of population between 18 years and 64 years (ACTIVE) is used to indicate 
the demographic group that is typically considered to be in wage and salaried employment. The 
coefficient for ACTIVE has the correct positive sign, but is insignificant. By contrast, an increase 
in the percent of population 65 years and older (RETIRE) is negatively related to per capita 
income growth. This suggests that counties experiencing an increase in the population whose 
main source of income is social security and other retirement income are unlikely to experience 
income growth. Another demographic variable related to income growth is the percent of Black 
population (BLACK). The coefficient for BLACK is negative and significant at the 10 percent 
level. These findings are realistic in view of the fact that majority of the black population in the 
Appalachia live in the southern and central counties.
12
 By all standards, the Appalachian 
Regional Commission considers the southern and central counties of Appalachia to be the most 
economically distressed region in the Appalachia.  
4.4 Change in Environmental Regulations Equation 
Estimated results for the environmental regulations equation are presented in column 4 of 
table 2. The estimated coefficient for 1992 environmental regulations (ENREG92) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. One explanation for this positive coefficient is that 
counties which are out-of-attainment in the initial period are likely to attract regulatory attention 
and thus positively influence changes in environmental regulations. This is in view of the fact 
that some counties will be out-of-attainment in a number of pollutants.  
Initial condition for population (POP92) is positively related to change in environmental 
regulation and is significant at the 1 percent level. This finding illustrates that air pollution varies 
with population and therefore, an increase in population will positively influence environmental 
                                                          
12
 Young et al. (2007) examine the relationship between race and economic growth using county level data on per 
capita income, socioeconomic, and demographic factors for Mississippi. They find evidence that indicate that an 
increase in percentage of Black population is negatively related to income growth.  
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regulations stringency. However, the magnitude of the population coefficient is very small. The 
coefficient for the 1992 per capita income (PCI92) is positive—reinforcing the hypothesis that 
an increase in income increases the demand for environmental quality, assuming that 
environmental quality is a normal good. The variable for change in per capita income (PCICH) 
has a positive effect on environmental regulation change (table 2), lending support to the theory 
that at high income levels, the policy response towards environmental degradation is stronger. 
While the coefficient for population change (POPCH) is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10 percent, the coefficient for change in employment (EMPCH) fails to attain any statistical 
significance.  
The EPA considers children below 5 years and adults above 65 years to be particularly 
sensitive to exposure to air pollutants. The percentage of the population who are considered 
sensitive (RISK) to environmental exposures has the expected positive sign. Ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the proportion of the sensitive group of people will result in an increase in the 
demand for stringent environmental regulations. Conceivably, community/public activism 
towards environmental issues will not only emanate from the population that is susceptible to 
illnesses due to environmental exposure, but will also come from environmental pressure groups, 
such as the Sierra Club and others. The coefficient estimate for Sierra Club (SIERRA) is positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level. These results provide evidence that environmental pressure 
groups are pro-environment and will exert pressure on regulatory agencies for enforcement of 
stringent environmental regulations. 
Previous studies also show that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is 
influenced by the political party that controls the executive branch and legislature (Hay et al. 
1996; Lynch, et al., 2004; Regens et al., 1997). Accordingly, the percent of votes cast for the 
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Democratic Presidential candidate (VOTE) appears to have a positive influence on environmental 
regulations outcomes. This finding is in accord with Kahn and Matsusaka‘s (1997) finding that 
Democratic Presidential voting patterns explain environmental outcomes. Additional information 
on the support for environmental regulation is provided by the positive and significant 
coefficient for proportion of population with a bachelor‘s degree (DEGREE). These findings 
suggest that counties featuring high levels of college graduates are more prone to support 
stringent environmental regulations and are likely to lobby effectively against pollution (Hackett, 
2001; Kahn, 2008). 
Population density (POPDEN) and percentage of population driving to work 
(POPDRIVE) are included as explanatory variables to control for the congestion externalities. 
The coefficients for population density and percentage of population driving to work are positive 
as shown in table 2. This follows because a dense population entails increased economic activity 
and also increased vehicular traffic, which both translate into increased emissions of pollutants. 
Similarly, regression results indicate that state road density (ROADDEN) positively influences 
changes in environmental regulation. These findings support the notion that highway expansions 
have increased vehicle miles traveled and this has also resulted in increased emission of 
pollutants due to changes in land use and neighborhood (Cassady, 2004). The coefficient for 
manufacturing establishment (MFG) has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 10 
percent level. This implies that counties with a high number of manufacturing establishments are 
likely to have more pollution and thus attract more enforcement of environmental regulations.  
To control for marginal exposures to pollution, we include the percent of the black 
population (BLACK) and the percent below the poverty rate (POVRATE) as explanatory 
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variables for change in environmental regulations.
13
 Surprisingly, regression results indicate that 
counties exhibiting a high percentage of the black population (BLACK) are associated with an 
increase in the stringency of environmental regulations. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for 
poverty rate (POVRATE) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. These findings 
contradict the widely held view in the environmental justice literature that environmental 
regulations are more strictly enforced in predominantly white and affluent neighborhoods than in 
black and economically depressed neighborhoods (Melosi and Pratt, 2007). A cursory look at 
figure 2 shows that in 2004 none of Mississippi‘s counties had a non-attainment designation for 
the ozone standard. This is important in view of the fact that Mississippi contains the largest 
number of the Black population and has the highest unemployment rates in Appalachia. These 
findings corroborate Gray and Deily‘s (1995) finding that more enforcement actions are directed 
towards plants located in communities with high unemployment rates. By the same token, it can 
be inferred that more enforcement actions will be directed towards plants located in minority 
neighborhoods in order to increase political support.   
6. Conclusions and Implications 
This study contributes to the body of literature by extending the analysis of the economic 
growth-environmental regulation relationship beyond firms and industries directly affected by 
environmental regulations. A regional growth model that takes into account the simultaneous 
interactions among population, income, employment, and environmental regulations is estimated 
using 3SLS. Our findings in this study can be summarized in two main propositions. First, initial 
environmental regulation stringency is negatively related to regional growth factors of 
                                                          
13
 The environmental justice literature documents that the African American and Hispanic populations are 
disproportionately exposed to environmental damages than the white population. Furthermore, the literature 
provides anecdotal evidence that shows that majority of polluting industrial facilities is in low income areas—
implying that people of lower socio-economic status will disproportionately suffer from environmental exposures 
(Sicotte, 2009).  
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population, employment, and per capita income. The initial conditions for environmental 
regulations intuitively suggest that firms in non-attainment counties invest in pollution abatement 
technologies in order to bring the air quality in compliance with federal standards. To this end, 
when firms initially invest in abatement capital, productivity (including labor demand) will go 
down, but this will be compensated by a gradual increase in environmental quality. 
Theoretically, this means that firms in the short-run will incur higher production costs due to 
investments in abatement technologies, and accordingly, the diversion of resources from 
production and investment activities will be inadvertently transmitted to other sectors of the 
economy—and thereby retard regional growth. This finding implicitly suggests that in the short-
run there is a trade-off between environmental quality and economic growth.  
Second, the empirical estimations show that change in environmental regulation is 
positively associated with regional growth factors of population, employment, and per capita 
income. Considering the fact that the time period for our analysis spans 15 years, we carefully 
interpret change in environmental regulations as the long-run effects. Within the endogenous 
growth theory framework, firms adopt improved technologies which gradually expand their 
production functions as well as improve environmental quality. Within this context, 
technological progress enables firms to lower the marginal cost of pollution control, and this 
allows firms to produce more with less pollution. Under this assumption, the efficient technology 
that firms invest in serves the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing environmental 
quality. In line with the amenities literature, improved environmental quality will positively 
influence firms‘ and households‘ (workers) location decisions and thus boost economic growth 
in terms of growth in population, income, and employment, respectively.  
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Like in previous studies, we find evidence that supports the hypothesis that changes in 
population, employment, and per capita income are interdependent. In addition, the empirical 
estimations show that socio-economic, political, and demographic characteristics influence the 
stringency of environmental regulations. The findings in this study reinforce the need to design 
and implement environmental regulations that stimulate economic growth and enhance 
environmental quality. Another policy implication is that besides imposing stringent 
environmental regulations on major polluting industries, attention needs to be paid to other 
socio-economic and demographic forces that contribute to emission of pollutants.  
It would be interesting for future research to quantify the impacts of spillover-effects that 
emanate from the spatial heterogeneity in economic policies and environmental regulation 
implementation among and within Appalachian states. Also, empirical evidence that indicates 
that counties featuring high unemployment rates and high Black populations are associated with 
stringent environmental regulation stringency should be interpreted with caution. Could we be 
committing a type I error by inferring that poor neighborhoods are not excessively exposed to air 
pollution relative to other communities? Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the 
simultaneous relationship between rate of exposure to pollutants and environmental regulation 
stringency. 
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Appendix 1: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variables 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Endogenous Variables   
POPCH Change in population (1992-2007)
 A
 22862 6196.8 
PCICH Change in per capita Income (1992-2007)
 A
 2152.3 10867 
EMPCH Change in total employment (1992-2007)
 A
 13524 5453.5 
ENREGCH Change in attainment status (1992-2007): 0= attainment, 
½ to 5= number of pollutants out-of-attainment 
B
 0.6479 0.2829 
Variables 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Initial Conditions   
EMP92 County employment in 1992
 A
 53959 25010 
ENREG92 County attainment status in 1992
 B
 0.7334 0.329 
PCI92 County per capita income in 1992
 A
 2530.2 13630 
POP92 County population in 1992 
A
 89059 50945 
 Exogenous Variables   
ACTIVE Percentage of population between 18 years and 64 years
A
 30.582 62.61 
AMEND Natural amenities index
D
 1.1632 0.1326 
CRIME Serious crimes per 100,000 of population, 1992
A
 1560.8 2251.9 
DEGREE Percent of persons 25 yrs & above with college degree
A
 4.981 10.498 
LGEXP Per capita local government expenditure
A
 2344.7 3782.7 
METRO Metropolitan counties, dummy  variable=1, 0 otherwise
D
 0.4410 0.26341 
MFG Number of manufacturing establishments in a county
C
 120.53 67.824 
MFGEMP 
Percent of civilian labor force employed in 
manufacturing
A
 11.367 26.236 
MHVAL County median housing value
A
 13528 47631 
PCTAX Local tax per capita, 1992
A
 160.88 285.31 
POPDEN Total population/land area
A
 133.03 101.27 
 
Variable  
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
POPDRIVE 
Percentage of population above 17 years driving to 
work
A
 5.3388 73.827 
POVRATE Percent of families with income below poverty rate
A
 8.0139 19.019 
PROPTAX Per capita local property tax
A
 17.519 72.362 
RETIRE Percentage of population above 65 years
A
 2.6548 20.921 
RISK Percentage of population below 5 years plus above 65
A
 2.6548 20.921 
ROADDEN Miles of state roads per square mile
E
 0.1160 0.32637 
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1 
SIERRA Dummy: 1 = Sierra chapters in a county, 0 otherwise
F
 
0.4687
2 0.67561 
UNEMP Civilian labor force unemployment rate (percent)
 A
 3.1947 9.3524 
VOTE Percentage of votes cast for Democratic President
A
 10.065 42.386 
Sources: A, County & City Data Book; B, CFR, Title 40, Part 81, Subpart C  and EPA Green book; C, U.S. Census 
Bureau (Dynamic Business Series); D, USDA/ERS-Creative class code; E, Natural Resource Analysis Center, West 
Virginia University; F, Sierra Club  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: 3SLS Empirical Results with State Dummy Variables 
Variable  
Name 
Population Employment Per Capita Income 
Environmental 
Regulation 
Coefficient  Value Coefficient  Value Coefficient  Value Coefficient  Value 
State Dummy Variables 
AL 11156 0.000 5375.81 0.023 376.487 0.3412 0.135 0.225 
GA 30855 0.002 11924.1 0.032 340.426 0.3832 0.621 0.000 
KY 3877.14 0.0001 −1102.33 0.004 −1350.710 0.0007 0.098 0.093 
MD 10184 0.0317 3813.67 0.117 1037.711 0.2056 0.333 0.229 
MS 4161.87 0.000 −1445.22 0.042 374.036 0.4701 0.213 0.945 
NY −101 0.936 −1947.62 0.0045 0.987 11.055 0.154 0.132 
NC 11618.1 0.0000 2981.77 0.067 −485.7886 0.2363 0.066 0.151 
OH 5316.03 0.000 1565.41 0.189 −1167.353 0.0053 0.448 0.000 
PA 1684.52 0.515 4292.67 0.001 −1113.823 0.0126 0.596 0.000 
SC 32857.6 0.010 14151.2 0.000 564.9907 0.4730 0.347 0.890 
TN 11670.2 0.000 3898.18 0.02986 −260.281 0.538 0.235 0.003 
VA 3199.48 0.000 −966.087 0.078 405.765 0.000 0.125 0.780 
WV 2414.78 0.004 −427.364 0.445 −304.972 0.412 0.404 0.00 
Constant 9013.233 0.001 7389.01 0.020 0.591 0.005 0.528 0.000 
Adj. R
2
 0.483 0.5580 0.4318 0.625 
Sample Size 410 410 410 410 
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Figure 2: 2004 Attainment and Non-attainment Areas in the U.S. 8 Hour Ozone Standard 
 
Source: EPA 
                                                          
i The NAAQS are a set of standards that represent the maximum permissible ambient 
concentrations of the six pollutants. To promote public health and welfare, the CAA has assigned 
the primary responsibility for air pollution regulation to state and local governments.  Thus, state 
and local governments administer the CAA by developing state implementation plans (SIP) 
which outline how states are going to comply with federal pollution standards. This means that 
U.S. states retain considerable flexibility in the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental regulations; this is reflected in the variation of regulatory intensity among states 
(Levison, 2000). Areas within a state that fail to meet the NAAQS for the six criteria pollutants 
established by the EPA are designated as non-attainment areas. A county‘s non-attainment status 
entails increased regulatory restrictions on polluting sources, and this, generally, results in 
increased pollution control compliance costs. In addition, the federal government can withhold 
federal funding for highway construction in non-attainment counties and impose a ban on the 
construction of new plants that would significantly add to emissions. Thus, the designation of a 
county as non-attainment may inadvertently result in loss of jobs and is likely to make a 
difference in whether or not a county will be able to retain and/or attract businesses.  
